Introduction and background
By 1998, important weaknesses in national communicable disease surveillance, outbreak preparedness and public health response systems in many African countries were widely recognised. In response, the World Health Organisation's Regional Office for Africa (WHO/AFRO) proposed the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy as an Africa-wide strategy to strengthen public health Global Public Health 365 surveillance and response (WHO 2000) . In addition, WHO/AFRO had a key role in developing generic technical guidelines (WHO 2001a) for adaptation by implement ing countries, as well as providing ongoing technical assistance and consultation.
Key goals of the IDSR strategy were the integration of multiple existing 'categorical' surveillance and response systems and linking surveillance, laboratory and other data with public health action. Whereas categorical systems may become highly effective, the multiplicity of such systems is highly inefficient from the standpoint of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and district health workers (Taylor et al. 1997 , WHO 2000 , Davey et al. 2006 . Further, they create uneven availability and use of resources. Ironically, with few exceptions, the highly qualified trained staff, surveillance and response systems that support prevention and control efforts for the targeted disease programmes have had relatively little beneficial effect on other programmes affecting the same communities (Sutter and Cochi 1997 , Taylor et al. 1997 , Nsubuga et al. 2002b .
Upon adoption of the IDSR strategy each country followed common steps: an assessment of their current national surveillance and response capacity, including laboratory services and infrastructure, followed by the development and implementation of a prioritised five-year action plan.
The assessment identified gaps and opportunities for strengthening. Tanzania conducted its assessment in 1998 (Brown et al. 1999 , Nsubuga et al. 2002a , followed by Ghana and Uganda in 2000 and Zimbabwe in 2003. The findings were similar in each country (CDC 2000 , Nsubuga et al. 2002a . For disease surveillance and control there was an absence of explicit priorities; there were numerous disease-specific surveillance systems with unique data collection requirements and processes; there was a lack of awareness of standardised surveillance case definitions; delayed, incomplete disease reporting and delayed investigation of case reports or suspected outbreaks. Laboratory confirmation of suspected outbreaks was limited, and there was no systematic collaboration or coordination between epidemiology and laboratory units. Analysis of surveillance data was limited, as was systematic surveillance feedback and supervisory visits from higher to lower public health system levels. There was a low level of preparedness to respond rapidly and effectively to outbreaks; inadequate resources for communication and transportation to support surveillance and response and insufficient training at all levels.
A prioritised five-year national plan of action was then developed to address the activities required to integrate and coordinate surveillance and response (WHO 2001b , McNabb et al. 2002 . Each country, with AFRO assistance, then adapted the generic WHO/AFRO technical guidelines for surveillance and response and training modules to accommodate their national objectives and public health system environment (WHO 2001a (WHO , 2003 .
In 2002, a three-year Interagency Agreement (IAA) was developed between the US Agency for International Development (USAID, who contributed to the development of implementing strategies as well as provided substantial funding support) and the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to provide technical support for IDSR implementation in Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe (CDC and United States Agency for International Development 2002). CDC then created the Global Surveillance Project (GSP) to implement the agreement.
In that same year, each of the four GSP countries began receiving the additional funding and technical support provided for in the IAA. This support included training in field epidemiology and related topics in each country and funding for Master of Public Health (MPH) students to participate in outbreak investigations conducted by the MOH, as well as for additional university and MOH staff to assist in implementing selected aspects of the IDSR strategy. Further, GSP, working with the staffs of the host countries' MOHs and universities and other CDC units, provided assistance in the development of the technical guidelines and epidemiologic capabilities of MOH human resources as well as for their implementation.
For 3 years, Ghana and Tanzania also received support from Partners for Health Reform plus (PHR plus), a USAID-supported project that assisted with IDSR implementation in eight (7%) of 110 districts in Ghana (Government of Ghana 2002) and 12 (11%) of 114 in Tanzania (Eisele et al. 2006) . IDSR guidelines and orientation and training materials for use throughout each country were developed, focussing on developing specific competencies needed to support implementation of their plan. Further, in 2002 the Ghana MOH received United Nations Foundation funding for a three-year project to strengthen integrated disease surveillance of vaccinepreventable diseases and linked this effort to their IDSR strategy (WHO 2005a) .
IDSR implementation in Ghana and Uganda led to the definition of job descriptions for district disease surveillance officers and district laboratory coordinators. However, during implementation, staffing the positions was difficult due to both the limited availability of trained personnel and of funding. As a result, the duties were often assigned to current staff in addition to their pre-existing duties and responsibilities.
Methods for evaluation of the integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR) implementation
This evaluation was designed to identify accomplishments in each of the four GSP countries and the lessons that could be learned from the experience. Three major IDSR components were identified for evaluation: epidemiologic surveillance and response; related public health laboratory services and the educational infrastructure that produces trained public health manpower. A guide was then developed to address these components, utilising core IDSR indicators developed collaboratively by WHO/AFRO, selected African countries and CDC (WHO 2006) . The evaluation was conducted between June and August 2005. It included reviews of project documents and a site visit to each of the four countries to interview the principal persons involved and review selected reports.
Key informants (KIs) in the epidemiology units of the Ministries of Health, the laboratories and the respective universities were interviewed. The questions asked of each group were identical in most instances, although in a few (noted below) there were some minor differences reflecting the principal contributions of the informant. The same set of interview questions was used in all four countries, in the same way and in the same order. All interviews were conducted by two of the authors (Groseclose and Brown). In most instances the interviews were with an individual informant, however, there sometimes were two informants in the same interview. For all positive or affirmative answers the respondents were asked to provide copies of appropriate documents (e.g., outbreak investigation reports, surveillance reports, laboratory data and evaluation findings). The questions addressed were: 
Results
During the field visits to each country, a total of 56 KI interviews were conducted, mainly at the national level, ranging from 9 to 20 per country. By discipline, 53% of the KIs were epidemiologists and surveillance staff members, 28% were school of public health staff, 13% laboratory technicians and 6% health management information system (HMIS) staff. While most of the MOH staff interviewed were from the national level, some were from sub-national levels. Some of the obstacles to including more were their availability, the time required to travel to district sites and the impossibility of getting a representative sample in a realistic period of time.
Limited quantitative data, in the form of previous studies, evaluation reports or epidemiology bulletins, were available.
Epidemiologic surveillance and response
Priority diseases for surveillance and response varied by country based on endemicity and the public health system's capacity to intervene. For example, while meningo coccal meningitis had epidemic potential and was included among the priority conditions in Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda, it was not endemic in Zimbabwe and was not included there as a priority disease (see Table 1 ). All four countries required case-based reporting for measles, neonatal tetanus and polio. Summary reporting was used for other priority diseases and represents the total number of cases by disease by time period (e.g., per week or per month). The ability to collect either case-based or summary data within the IDSR framework not only supported the unique data needs for some disease control programmes (which facilitated integration), but also allowed the same data source to seamlessly report different data for different conditions within the same surveillance infrastructure. Following the selection of priority diseases, standardised case definitions were developed, distributed and reviewed during training sessions. During non-outbreak periods, the laboratory-confirmation status of cases reported at the national level was usually not differentiated due to the delay in receipt of laboratory results and the inability to link the laboratory report with the corresponding case report.
IDSR implementation re-emphasised the value of surveillance data, and many important changes resulted (see Table 2 ). Each country, for example, was encouraged to track its data by monitoring the timeliness and completeness of weekly and monthly morbidity reporting. Providing feedback on these surveillance attributes, even irregularly, resulted in more consistent and complete data collection and reporting and improvements in surveillance data quality (see Figure 1) .
Another important development occurred in Uganda, where the MOH began publishing weekly disease morbidity data in a weekly nationally distributed news paper. Publication costs were high, but feedback indicated that national and subnational political and technical leaders became aware of the data and frequently inquired about the data presented. As improved data quality stabilised, in 2002 and 2003, it revealed high measles incidence (3000�5000 reported nationally each 
Adopted by three of the four countries Meningococcal meningitis
T, U, Z T a All four countries also established case-based reporting for this condition. Note: G, Ghana; T, Tanzania; U, Uganda; Z, Zimbabwe. Improvements in surveillance data quality led directly to an increased data management burden in each country. Several respondents reported the need for additional data management expertise. The response also led some of the countries to purchase varying kinds and amounts of computer hardware and software intended to assist with data management and analysis activities, but this information technology equipment was often poorly utilised due to the limited information technology expertise among public health system staff. While respondents reported improvements in each of these surveillance processes as a result of IDSR implementation, some activities (e.g., generation or dissemina tion of weekly surveillance bulletins) had been achieved that could not always be sustained. Further, none of the four countries had integrated the surveillance and response activities associated with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and leprosy prevention and control programmes into the overall IDSR framework.
Measles cases
Outbreak response teams with defined membership and operational protocols were established in each country at the national level (see Table 3 ). Sub-national teams were established in some districts in each country, but the coverage was limited.
While most outbreak documentation reflected the work of national level MOH staff, school of public health students, who are largely MOH employees, were important members of the response teams in Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and were often responsible for documenting the outbreak investigation and findings. The MPH programmes in the participating countries take part in field epidemiology training where trainees are taught to provide epidemiologic service as part of their training. In Uganda, MPH students generated 10�15 abwe reak outbreak investigation reports each year, between 2002 and 2004; and Zimb published an intern 02�200 eristics al report summarising disease outbreaks, 'Disease Outb Summary, 20 5'. Each country had a system for monitoring outbreaks and their charact but the systems were maintained irregularly.
Public health laboratory services
Early steps towards strengthening the laboratory's role in surveillance and response included adapting and disseminating selected laboratory standard operating procedures, establishing stronger laboratory networks and strengthening working relationships between the laboratory and disease surveillance units at national and sub-national levels (see Table 4 ). Some training was provided in each country to support implementation of these steps.
Each country reported the ability to confirm selected priority conditions and test for antimicrobial resistance, but the level of the laboratory network that could confirm these conditions varied and was found mainly at the national level. Some districts had local access to laboratory services while others had to transport specimens to regional or more distant laboratories, often leading to poor specimen quality due to inadequate handling, storage and transportation.
There was evidence of laboratory reporting to support IDSR in Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe, though respondents reported difficulty in linking laboratory and disease surveillance data due to delayed reporting and inadequate documentation. Laboratory staff members were explicitly members of each national outbreak response team, but laboratory participation on district response teams was not consistent (only Uganda re s) � of orato ak re ported routine involvement of district laboratory staff on district response team ten due to incomplete laboratory networks, especially the absence of trained lab rians. Numerous outbre ports documented the limited availability of specimen collection supplies and reagents to support surveillance and response. Even so, respondents in each country reported an overall increasing trend of collection, referral and testing of specimens for confirmation. In 2005, Uganda reported that Global Public Health 375 24 (43%) of its 56 districts had submitted specimens for outbreak investigations in the past 12 months. During the same period, laboratory testing confirmed 20 (61%) of 33 suspected cholera outbreaks reported for which specimens were submitted, 14 (61%) of 23 suspected dysentery outbreaks, 14 (78%) of 18 suspected meningitis outbreaks and four (67%) of six suspected typhoid outbreaks.
Uganda, Ghana and Zimbabwe specifically mentioned the usefulness of antimicrobial testing to guide case management, often allowing the MOH to recommend the use of first, rather than third, generation antimicrobials for priority conditions. An episode occurred during the evaluation team's site visit to Uganda that exemplifies this. In recent cholera outbreaks Ugandan epidemiologists identified a shift in the causative agent, from Vibrio cholerae Ogawa to V. cholerae Inaba. Further, antimicrobial resistance testing indicated that the Inaba isolates were resistant to the standard recommended antimicrobial therapy. The MOH responded by preparing a press release to inform District Medical Directors of Health Services and health care providers of the change in cholera epidemiology and the need to modify the recommended treatment based on susceptibility testing. Additionally, the national outbreak response team was mobilised to investigate the outbreak associated with the most recent isolation.
Educational infrastructure
In Ghana, Uganda and Zimbabwe, developing and using locally available epidemio logic capacity was facilitated through collaborating with the field epidemiology training programmes affiliated with the Public Health School without Walls project (Tanzania did not have a comparable programme). Funded by Rockefeller Foundation with technical support from the CDC and WHO, these organisations have been sustained for many years (Beaglehole et al. 2001 , White et al. 2001 , Nsubuga et al. 2006 . They were designed based on the US Epidemic Intelligence Service, and provide field-based epidemiology and public health management training.
The schools of public health in each country expressed willingness to continue to support the training needs of the general public health system through their PHSWOW MPH programmes; and, more importantly, a desire to expand their role in provision of workforce training specific to IDSR via in-service training or other mechanisms. And the schools, in fact, were an important part of the answer to this need. In Ghana, for example, the university collaborated with the Ghana Health Service in designing and conducting training at the district level.
Discussion
While IDSR is a work in progress it is strengthening systems and workforces in African countries. Adoption and implementation of the IDSR strategy provided a framework for revisiting their surveillance priorities and objectives and plans of action. Other valuable contributions included: explicit linkage of surveillance and public health investigations; increased efficiency resulting from integration of surveillance systems and processes; increased emphasis on the role of district public health teams in response, and the definition of their needs; integration of epidemiological and laboratory activities and data; epidemiology, laboratory and workforce capacity building and strengthened partnerships between categorical disease programmes, laboratories and the public and private health care sectors.
The public health process and system changes and their geographic and population coverage varied widely by country. This is largely a result of limited personnel and resources, workforce turnover, competing priorities and inconsistent domestic and international leadership.
Implementation of the IDSR strategy in these four countries directly led to improved data collection, reporting, analysis and monitoring and strengthened the culture of data use for decision-making at the national and sub-national levels. Several respondents reported that prior to IDSR, outbreaks were often handled 'politically' due to concerns regarding the potential social and economic implications, which is an important barrier to transparent domestic and global reporting and response (Cash and Narasimhan 2000) . Suspected outbreaks are now more widely recognised as public health events that require investigation and response by the health sector. Epidemiological data and methods were increasingly well-utilised by surveillance and response teams at district, regional and national levels for outbreak detection and response. Unfortunately, there was little evidence that these data were used by higher level technical and political leaders to prioritise and plan more effective prevention programmes and to allocate resources for improved prevention. This remains an important challenge.
Involving schools of public health, which train using a field-based approach, was a successful strategy and also led to improvements in the schools' own capability for public health workforce capacity development. The IDSR partnerships are helping move countries towards meeting the new International Health Regulations, which call for improved national capacity and transparency by 2007 (WHO 2005b .
Translating the IDSR implementation experience of these four countries to other countries is subject to at least four limitations. First, the information in the evaluation was self-reported by interested parties (however, this is significantly offset, we believe, by the high level of consistency of responses among the KIs, who worked in diverse settings and organisations and countries). Second, the evaluation findings are largely qualitative in nature and alternate sources for independent validation were limited. Third, few quantitative comparison (e.g., before, after) measures of the surveillance and response processes were available. Fourth, there was limited information available on the coverage of IDSR below the district level, a consequence of both our collection of data at the national public health system level and the limited monitoring and evaluation data reported from lower levels of the public health system, and possibly the effect of initiation of IDSR from the national level downwards.
Conclusions and recommendations
Because IDSR is a WHO/AFRO-wide strategy, it is important to distil lessons learned:
. First, involve partners and stakeholders in the initial and subsequent assessments of surveillance and response organisation, resources and practices and in the development of a common action plan that defines roles, responsibilities and timelines to address public health priorities and objectives. The countries' leadership, ownership and full partnership were crucially important.
. Second, establish a national MOH Advisory Committee responsible for oversight of and advocacy for implementation of the IDSR strategy. The Committee should meet regularly to monitor key IDSR performance indicators to provide guidance regarding response to emerging issues and allocation of resources, as well as to ensure a continued focus on integrated strategies that promote IDSR and its goals. . Third, initiate routine monitoring and evaluation of IDSR performance indicators prior to and throughout the IDSR implementation process. . Fourth, strengthen and systematise the interchange of surveillance and outbreak investigation findings between public health system levels and between public and private sector stakeholders. . Fifth, partner with academic and training organisations to increase the public health workforce and to provide effective, ongoing professional development for the current workforce. Where possible, use competency-based applied epidemiology training programmes, e.g., field epidemiology training pro grammes. Graduates, staff and students of these programmes should be used to train lower-level health workers, using field-based, impact-oriented methods that provide measurable effects in the short term as they build capacity (Nsubuga et al. 2006 . . Sixth, strengthen clinical and public health laboratory networks and maintain linkages between laboratory and epidemiology staff at all levels of the public health system. Confirmation of suspect cases is necessary for appropriate case management and outbreak response.
Experiences such as this evaluation reveal the uncertainties of planning assumptions, the timing and amount of resources needed and available, political will, the time and effort required to change some things and other factors. This evaluation and manuscript casts light on many of these and on their sum and serves to alert others to the complexities of planned change even in such a circumscribed area as disease surveillance and control. Since the time of this assessment, IDSR implementation has continued in each of these four countries and has begun in several others on the African continent. In view of the time since the evaluation, one can question whether the assessment data are still useful. Interestingly, the data, lessons learned and recommendations noted above, have remained useful in both situations. While the data describing the then current status of disease surveillance and response in these four countries may no longer be reliably descriptive, they have turned out to be an accurate predictor of what to expect in countries that newly unde � rce rtake to strengthen their systems through implementation of the IDSR strategy their initial status, priority setting and planning needs, anticipation of resou needs and implementation issues, and managing change.
Thus the data, lessons learned and recommendations have been invaluable in informing ministries of health as to realistic expectations and developmental methods.
That these six recommendations arose directly from the experiences of the four countries, and further are sound from the standpoint of epidemiologic practice and developmental work generally, attests to their appropriateness. With the increasing requirements for timely and effective disease and outbreak detection and control, including the WHO's new International Health Regulations, and resources being made available for improving public health in Africa, the question of using these effectively and efficiently, always important, is now in the forefront. It is important that the countries using these resources use developmental models that are not only technically sound but grounded in their own realities.
